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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
The United States board of tax appeals ruled in a case (B. T. A. decision 281,
docket 802) that where a portion of an employee’s salary had been credited to
his account on the books of his employer the amount credited was not taxable
income to the employee unless it was available to him. A reading of the entire
decision reveals that because of the financial condition of the employer the
employee’s salary was not available.
In another case (B. T. A. decision 298, docket 553) the board held that a
dividend declared in 1917, and credited to the stockholders’ accounts in that
year, although it was to be paid when and as directed by the officers or directors,
was to be regarded as a distribution in the year in which the dividend was de
clared. It appears that the corporation’s financial condition was such that the
dividends could have been paid in 1917. Upon a casual reading of the two
foregoing decisions it would appear that there was some conflict in the two
decisions but a more careful reading reveals that in one case the salary though
credited to the employee was not available for his uses because of the financial
position of the employer, and in the other it is presumed the dividends credited
to stockholders’ accounts in the books were available to them because the
earnings in the year in which the dividend was declared were sufficient to make
them available. It does not appear in the record of this case, however, that the
earnings of 1917 had become sufficiently liquid to render a distribution possible.
As the record shows that the corporation had sustained losses in the two next
preceding years to 1917, it would appear a probability that the earnings of 1917
could not have been transformed in such a manner that year as to render the
dividends credited to the stockholders in 1917 available for their uses in that
year.
The question as to whether or not compensation of employees of a munici
pally owned utility for services they render to it is taxable income seems to be
unsettled. The conflict in two court decisions as to this question was pointed
out in these columns in last month’s issue. Another court decision has been
made which seems to complicate the solution of this question, and it is probable
that the final adjudication will not be had until a court of last resort has passed
upon it. In the case of Seattle et al. v. Poe, Collector et al, tried in U. S. district
court, D. Washington, N. D., it was held that “proceedings for the collection of
income taxes on compensation of employees of a municipally owned street
railway system will not be enjoined.” The court points out that “to attempt
to tax a state highway, with its bridges and ferries, which are absolutely es
sential to the freedom and liberty of its citizens, is a vastly different thing in its
principle from the taxation of the income of individual employees of a municipal
street-car system, operated as a business upon the state’s highways.”

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Where a partnership has become bankrupt, the government’s claim for taxes
assessed against the individual members of the partnership is not to be paid
prior to the payment of partnership creditors. (U. S. supreme court decision
in U. S. v. Kaufman; U. S. v. Coxe.)
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A lessee of a mine holding a lease upon a royalty basis and sub-leasing to
another upon a royalty basis is entitled to a depletion deduction under the act
of 1916. (U. S. supreme court decision in case of Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens
Co.)
A taxpayer, owner in fee of land, who leased the same for the purpose of
exploration for oil and gas, is not entitled to deduct an amount as cost to him of
the leasehold estate. (B. T. A. decision 265, docket 720.)
A balance remaining in capital account representing the cost of an exclusive
business privilege may be deducted from gross income as a loss in the year in
which the privilege is terminated. (B. T. A. decision 269, docket 747.)
A corporation which acquired patents from a stockholder and agreed to pay
a sum each year based upon the profits therefrom, and at the same time in
creased its capital stock without any reference to the patents is not entitled to
include any amount in its invested capital representing the estimated value of
the patents. (B. T. A. decision 274, docket 346.)
A taxpayer who consistently charged to expense over a period of years the
cost of molds and patterns is not entitled to amend his books of account and
charge the cost to capital account and deduct depreciation thereon. (B. T. A.
decision 274, docket 346.)
Salary credited to employee on the books of a corporation is not taxable
unless it is available for the use of the employee.
Acceptance by an employee of non-par-value shares of stock of a corporation,
that has no market value, in consideration for settlement for unpaid salary and
for advances to corporation does not result in taxable income to employee.
(B. T. A. decision 281, docket 802.)
A resolution of the board of directors of a corporation directing that a surplus
fund be placed to the credit of the stockholders “to be paid to the stockholders
when and as directed by the officers or directors” constitutes a dividend at the
time the resolution was passed.
A dividend declared by a corporation in 1917, prior to August 6th of that
year, out of March 1, 1913, surplus is not taxable to its stockholders as income.
(B. T. A. decision 298, docket 553.)
Where the taxpayer’s sole witness admits that a portion of his testimony was
false, the board may regard all of his testimony as having no weight in estab
lishing error on the part of the commissioner in determining a deficiency. (B.
T. A. decision 314, docket 1213.)
Where the corporate stock is so closely held that it can not be valued upon the
basis of sales in the open market, its value will be determined upon the basis of
assets and earnings. (B. T. A. decision 320, docket 1337.)
TREASURY RULINGS

(T. D. 3682; March 9, 1925)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court

1. Income—Dividends—Allocation.
Section 201 (e) of the revenue act of 1918, providing that “any distribution
made during the first 60 days of any taxable year shall be deemed to have been
made from earnings or profits accumulated during preceding taxable year,”
applies to the returns of corporations and not to the returns of individuals.
2. Same—Rate of Taxation.
Taxable dividends received by individuals during the first 60 days of the year
1918 are taxed at the rates prescribed by the revenue act of 1918. (Art. 1542
of Regs. 45 sustained.)
The following decision of the United States court of claims in the case of
Thomas M. Adams v. The United States is published for the information of
internal revenue officers and others concerned.
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Court of Claims of the United States
Thomas M. Adams v. The United States
(Decided February 9, 1925)
Downey, judge, delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiff made an income tax return for the year 1918 in which he segre
gated dividends to the amount of $83,647, received during the first 60 days of
1918, from $51,097 of dividends received during that year, but subsequent to
the first 60 days, and computed his income tax on the basis of the application to
the first-named amount of the rates provided by law for the year 1917. The
commissioner of internal revenue, holding that the entire income from dividends
received during 1918 was subject to the prescribed rates for that year, levied an
additional tax to the amount of $28,245.10, which plaintiff paid under protest
and seeks to recover here, having first duly presented to the commissioner a
claim for refund.
Plaintiff’s reliance is upon paragraph (e) of section 201 of the revenue act of
February 24, 1919 (40 Stat., 1057, at 1060), which, in part, is as follows:
“ (e) Any distribution made during the first 60 days of any taxable year shall
be deemed to have been made from earnings or profits accumulated during pre
ceding taxable year; ...”
And the contention is that the surtax on the dividends received by the plain
tiff during the first 60 days of 1918 should have been taxed at the 1917 rate.
The question is purely one of statutory construction without complications
otherwise arising.
Section 201, subhead “dividends,” appears, like the preceding section, under
the head “general provisions,” and, while section 200 bears the subhead
“definitions,” it is apparent that section 201 is also definitive in character and
does not attempt to deal with applicable rates.
We are mindful of the established rules cited by counsel as to the construction
of taxing statutes and if there were no room for the application of paragraph
(e) otherwise than to the matter of applicable individual rates they would
perhaps be of some force in determining construction, but that condition cer
tainly does not prevail.
There is abundant application for the paragraph in question under the vari
ous provisions of the revenue act having to do with the returns by corporations
of their fiscal affairs, so evident that a review seems wholly unnecessary, to
which it may be added that the language of the paragraph applies itself natu
rally to the fiscal affairs of the corporation paying the dividends and not to the
individual receiving them. The provision must certainly mean that “any
distribution,” referring necessarily to a distribution made by the corporation
as dividends, within the first 60 days of any taxable year, shall be deemed, so
far as the corporation is concerned, to have been made from the earnings or
accumulated profits of a preceding year, and we find no room for its application
to the individual income tax return of the recipient of those dividends. Ex
tended discussion seems unnecessary.
We conclude that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover and have accordingly
ordered that his petition be dismissed.

(T. D. 3677, February 27, 1925)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1921—Decision of supreme court
1. Income Tax—Income From Exports—Constitutionality.
An income tax levied upon net income from the business of exporting goods
from the United States and selling such goods in foreign countries is not a tax
laid on articles exported from any state in violation of article I, section 9,
clause 5, of the constitution of the United States.
2. Same—Revenue Act of 1921—Constitutionality.
An income tax levied under the revenue act of 1921 upon net income from
the business of exporting goods from the United States and selling them in
foreign countries, even though the act be construed as exempting from such
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tax the income of foreign corporations from like sources, does not deprive the
taxpayer of his property without due process of law in violation of the fifth
amendment to the constitution of the United States; nor does such a tax violate
the rule of uniformity.
The appended decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of National Paper & Type Co. v. Frank K. Bowers, Collector, is published
for the information of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
Supreme Court of the United States.

No. 320—October Term, 1924

National Paper & Type Co., plaintiff in error v. Frank K. Bowers, Collector of
Internal Revenue for the Second District of New York,

In error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of
New York.
(December 15, 1924)
Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court.
The case, displayed by the amended complaint, omitting verbal circum
locutions, is as follows: Plaintiff (plaintiff in error here) is and was at all of the
times mentioned a corporation organized and existing under the laws of New
Jersey. It is engaged in New York in the business of exporting, which is
defined to be the purchase of personal property within the United States and
the sale thereof without the United States, and has under the revenue act of
1921 been required to pay an income tax on its net income, part of which is
derived from such foreign business.
At the same time and times there were foreign corporations engaged in like
business of buying personal property within the United States and exporting
and selling it without the United States. Under sections 217 and 233 of the
revenue act of 1921 these corporations were wholly exempted from payment
of the tax on the net income or profits accruing or derived from such business.
On the 15th of March, 1922, the defendant (defendant in error here), being
collector of internal revenue, and acting as such, in pursuance of sections 230
and 205 of the revenue act of 1921, demanded of plaintiff the sum of $4,203.91,
as due and payable from the plaintiff as one-fourth part of its income tax for
the fiscal year ending March 31, 1921—that is, for the months of January,
February and March, 1921—and threatened to enforce payment of that sum
together with penalties and interest thereon provided for by the laws of
congress.
Plaintiff, on the 15th of March, 1922, solely to prevent distraint and sale of
its property, and protesting that no tax was due, and that defendant was
without authority to exact or collect the same or any part thereof, paid the
tax.
On or about the 6th of December, 1922, plaintiff, in accordance with law,
made a claim in writing to the commissioner of internal revenue and demanded
the repayment of the tax on the ground that it was illegally assessed, that more
than six months had expired since the filing of the claim for refund as provided
for by section 1318 of the revenue act, and that no part of the claim had been
remitted or repaid to plaintiff, or to anyone, for its account. This action was
then brought against the collector.
Judgment was prayed for $3,999.08, the amount of the tax.
Motion was made by the district attorney to dismiss the amended complaint
on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action.
The motion was granted on the authority of and upon the reasoning of
National Paper & Type Co. v. Edwards, Collector of Internal Revenue (292 Fed.,
633). Judgment was formally entered dismissing the complaint upon the
merits.
To review this action and judgment, this writ of error is directed. The
difference in treatment of domestic and foreign corporations in respect to busi
ness of sales in foreign countries, it is contended, is a “hostile discrimination
and confiscation of property.”
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To sustain the charge, plaintiff asserts that its business and that of foreign
corporations is done under exactly the same circumstances and conditions and
that the discrimination hence resulting offends the “due process of law” pro
vision of the fifth amendment. Cases are cited, and the deduction from them
is declared to be that “our whole system of law is predicated on the general
fundamental principle of equality of application of the law.” (Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312.)
Here the discrimination, if such it can be called, is in favor of foreign cor
porations in respect to taxation of earnings from business done in foreign
countries. Clearly as to such business congress may adopt a policy calcu
lated to serve the best interests of this country in dealing with citizens or
subjects of another country, and may properly say that as to earnings from
such business, the foreign subjects or citizens shall be left to the taxation of
their own government or to that having jurisdiction of the sales. Even if we
were to concede, as we can not, that the fifth amendment in enjoining due
process of law requires as part thereof equality of taxation, it certainly could
not be held to apply to a subject matter not within this country.
Regarding the purchase of articles of personal property within the United
States and the mere fact of exportation therefrom, domestic and foreign cor
porations may be pronounced alike—may seem to be in the same relation to
taxing legislation. But there is something else to consider, and its effect.
There may be benefit in the inviting of foreign corporations into the United
States—benefit in their investments and activities; and, as counsel for the
government points out, the domestic corporation gets the power of the United
States to protect its interests and redress its wrongs in whatever part of the
world its business may take it. And as the government further points out,
the foreign corporation must look to the country of its origin for protection
against injury and redress of losses occurring in that and other foreign coun
tries, and not to the United States. The government, therefore, contends, and
rightly contends, that domestic corporations are required to pay a tax on their
incomes from all sources while foreign corporations are taxed only on their
income from sources within the United States because, to repeat, only that
income is earned under the protection of American laws.
And we understand a further contention to be that the discrimination is the
fact that makes the tax on plaintiff a direct burden on and impediment to its
business of exporting, "in violation of paragraph 5 of section 9 of article I
of the constitution of the United States, which provides that ‘no tax or duty
shall be laid on articles exported from any state.’” The alleged discrimina
tion is said in some way to emphasize and increase the violation of that para
graph of the constitution.
So far as the invocation of paragraph 5 depends upon discrimination, what
we have said disposes of it; if it be independent of discrimination and based
upon the fact of a tax upon exports, it is completely answered and disposed
of adversely by Peck & Co. v. Lowe (247 U. S. 165), and needs no further
comment.
The difference in the legislation, we think, is constitutional and justified by
the considerations which we have submitted. The judgment is affirmed.
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